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Realism and Model Theory
1 Introduction
Putnam tried to deploy model theory to reach metaphysical conclusions about
the legitimacy of realism. In the ‘indeterminacy’ strand, he levelled three crit-
icisms: first, his permutation argument strove to prove that realist theories
have unintended permuted models; second, his Skolemisation argument strove
to prove that their theories have unintended countable models; third, his con-
structivisation argument strove to prove that all empirical evidence is consistent
with the Axiom of Constructibility. If successful, Putnam’s arguments under-
mine external realist accounts of truth by way of radical referential indetermi-
nacy between language and world.
I shall defend Putnam’s argument as follows. In §2, I lay the background
for, and provide an exposition of, Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments and
how they culminate in the ‘just-more-theory’ manoeuvre. In §3, I examine
the metamathematical challenges posed by Bays against Putnam. In §4-7, I
provide counter arguments to ‘Bays Dilemma’ on behalf of the permutation,
Skolemaisation, and constructivisation arguments. I shall therefore conclude
that all the arguments are immune to metamathematical objections, and so,




I will henceforth characterise positions within realism as on a line, with one
end at external realism and the other at internal realism. I will characterise
the externalist programme as aspiring to reason from a ‘God’s Eye point of
view’1 from which the realist can evaluate our referential relation with the world.
The internal realist in contrast discards this ability to evaluate an objective
referential relation, and instead maintains that truth is relative to our conceptual
schemes. However, referring through such schemes still determines a referential
relation which distinguishes internal realism from relativism.
1Putnam 1980, 100
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More specifically, following Button,2 we can illustrate external realism as
subscribing to the following three principles:
1. Independence: The world consists of a fixed totality of mind-independent
objects.
2. Correspondence: Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation be-
tween words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things.
3. Cartesianism: What is epistemically most justifiable to believe may nonethe-
less be false.
2.2 Models and reality
Putnam strove to disprove the legitimacy of this external realist programme by
constructing a model-theoretic analysis of the three principles.
Assume an external realist holds a theory T0. Assume T0 is expressed in a
formal language as follows:
• Constant symbols: c1, c2, ..., cn.
• Predicate symbols: R1, R2, ..., Rn.
• Function symbols: f1, f2, ..., fn.
Let W denote the external realist’s world, and T0’s intended model. W’s
domain, W, is constituted by the objects which make up W. The relations
between language and world is as follows:
• Constants, ‘c’, are mapped to the objects cW in the domain of W.
• Predicates, ‘R’, are mapped to sets RW of objects (or pairs, triples, etc.
of objects) pulled from W.
• Functions, ‘f ’, map inputs from its domain to outputs in its range pulled
from W.
This analysis illustrates the three principles as follows. For Correspondence
the analysis characterises reference as a mapping between words of the formal
language and objects in the world. For Independence the analysis characterises
the world as a mind-independent model. For Cartesianism the analysis renders
it a mind-independent case which model is the true model of the world, and
there is always a possibility of saying something false about the world.3
This model-theoretic treatment aligns with an entrenched three-step ap-
proach for performing fundamental metaphysics post-Quine:4 we first specify
the fundamental ontology, then the ideology, and finally its laws. This encour-





• Domain = ontology.
• Language = ideology.
• Axioms = laws.
Whilst this does not entail that any individual external realist has to adopt
model theory itself, it does lend credibility to assume that the above analysis
is an appropriate instrument for characterising external realism, without nec-
essarily committing the external realist to the existence of any of the models
themselves.
2.3 The model-theoretic arguments
This model-theoretic analysis allowed Putnam to deploy results from model the-
ory against external realism. In particular, he presented two model-theoretic
arguments: indeterminacy and infallibilism. The indeterminacy argument shows
that there are many equally correct correspondence relations, which undermines
the Correspondence principle. The infallibilism argument shows that ideal the-
ories are infallible, which undermines the Cartesianism principle. Jointly these
arguments severely undermine the external realist programme.
I will be interested in objections to the Correspondence principle, and so, I
will constrain my discussion to the argument for indeterminacy. The argument
posits the following conditional:
The Indeterminacy Conditional : If there is a way to make a theory
true, then there are many ways to make the theory true.
If true, this claim threatens external realism with the notion that it will be
entirely indeterminate which correspondence relation of all possible correspon-
dence relations is the true one.
The indeterminacy argument is itself composed of three sub-arguments: per-
mutation, Skolemisation, and constructivisation.
The permutation argument posits the following theorem:
The Permutation Theorem: Let T be a theory with a non-trivial
model. T has multiple distinct isomorphic models.
Proof : Let W model the external realist’s theory T0, and let W be the domain
of W. By the Permutation Theorem we can generate a distinct but isomorphic
model as follows: a permutation h over the domain W of W will shuffle the
objects, cW1 , ..., c
W
n , in W around, yielding a new model, P. P has the same
domain as the original model, W, but differs on the interpretation of every
object. So, we have generated a distinct but isomorphic model. Since W and
P are isomorphic, they evaluate the truth values of sentences in T0 identically,
and no possible sentence of the object language can be added to T0 to tell them
apart.
So, either of the following schemes can yield T0’s reference relation:
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‘t ’ refers to tW .
‘t ’ refers to tP .
Either of these schemes can yield the correspondence relation:
‘Rt1, ..., tn’ is true iff 〈tW1 , ..., tWn 〉 ∈ RW
‘Rt1, ..., tn’ is true iff 〈tP1 , ..., tPn 〉 ∈ RP

In sum, the external realist cannot maintain the Correspondence principle
because evaluating the truth value of all sentences in a language will always be
insufficient to determine the reference and correspondence relation.
The Skolemisation argument posits the following theorem:
The Completeness Theorem: Let T be any consistent countable set
of sentences of a first-order language. There is a model N |= T
whose domain is a subset of N.
Proof : Assume the external realist holds a theory, T0, whose intended modelW
is uncountable. By the Completeness Theorem of first-order logic, if T0 has a
model, then it has a countable model N . W and N are distinct but isomorphic.
Since W and N are isomorphic, they evaluate the truth values of sentences
in T0 identically. So, as in the case of permutation, there is no definite way
to determine the reference and correspondence relation since there is nothing
determinate to distinguish W or N as the true model.

The constructivisation argument posits the following theorem:
The Constructivisation Theorem: For any s ⊆ N, there is an ω-
model,5 M, of ZF + V = L,6 such that s is represented in M.
Proof : Assume the external realist holds a theory, T0, whose intended model
W contains the sentence ‘V 6= L’. ‘V 6= L’ can, for instance, be proven by a
subset s ⊆ N, where s is generated by a completely random procedure. If s is
generated by such a random procedure, s need not be a definable subset of N.
So s could be genuinely non-constructible. By the Constructivisation Theorem,
if s is genuinely non-constructible, then it exists in a model M. W and M
could be distinct but isomorphic. Mutatis mutandis. So, sentences like ‘V 6= L’
is simply true in some models and false in others, and the external realist cannot
decisively distinguish which is the true one.

5An ω-model is a model of set theory whose numbers are the set of natural numbers N.
6‘V = L’ is the Axiom of Constructibility where ‘V’ denotes the set-theoretic hierarchy and
‘L’ denotes the constructable set-theoretic hierarchy
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In sum, Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments threaten the external real-
ist’s conception of truth by way of radical indeterminacy in the correspondence
between language and world. So, the external realist is forced to provide an
account of what makes a particular correspondence relation the true one. Or,
in other words, the external realist must describe what makes an interpretation
intended.7
2.4 Preferable models and just-more-theory
The immediate response to Putnam’s indeterminacy argument is to hold that
some models are more preferable than others for explaining reference. This
‘preferability’ can be glossed in numerous ways, but the common argument is
that some notion of preferability can distinguish isomorphic models, and this
preferability can determine reference. Such a preference hierarchy would coun-
teract Putnam’s indeterminacy argument since the unintended models could be
distinguished from the intended model.
For instance, let us follow Kripke and gloss preferability in terms of causa-
tion.8 The Permutation Theorem noted that the instantiation of every object
in W and P differ. Say that in W, the predicate C: ‘... is Chanel No. 5’,
picks out two perfumes: cW1 , c
W
2 ; but in P, C picks out a mixture of perfumes
and non-perfumes: cP1 ,¬cP2 . The permuted model, P, thus seems indifferent
to the causal relationships that map the word ‘Chanel No. 5’ to the perfumes
in the domain. So, a preferable model seemingly has to respect certain causal
constraints on the reference relationship between language and objects.
In response, Putnam maintains that any account of preferability must char-
acterise the preferability relation and describe how preferable models better
clarify reference,9 i.e. external realists have to commit to a theory of prefer-
ability. However, the permutation argument says that any theory has several
models. So, the theory of preferability is ‘just-more-theory’ – more fodder for
the permutation grinder. So preferability cannot rescue the reference relation.
This can be iterated into an infinite regress. So, radical referential indetermin-
ism seems hard to circumvent for the external realist.
3 Bays Dilemma
Instead of diving further into the debate surrounding the external realist’s claim
that Putnam’s ‘just-more-theory’ argument is or is not avoidable, I instead in-
tend to focus on a more fundamental issue raised by Bays – namely, whether
the metamathematical underpinnings of permutation, Skolemisation, and con-
structivisation are legitimate. This, I regard, may be the only adequate way to
7Even if the external realist attempts to forfeit correspondence for a more generic truthmak-
ing theory, their attempts will similarly fail since a more generic theory is easier to generate




oppose Putnam’s argument, since it is the only alternative which could avoid the
‘just-more-theory’ manoeuvre and undermine Putnam from within rather than
appealing to ‘magic’. Bays’ argument pertains most closely to constructivisa-
tion. However, he intends his objection to raise an intrinsic erroneous feature in
all of Putnam’s arguments, and so it should apply equally well against Skolemi-
sation and permutation.10 I shall argue this is unfounded on all points.
In essence, the model-theoretic arguments as laid out in §2.3 have the fol-
lowing outline. The external realist posits a theory, T0, posing to describe the
world W as its intended model M0. Putnam uses some model theory, T1, to
generate an additional model, M1. M0 and M1 are distinct but isomorphic.
So, the external realist must provide some theory as to why M1 is unintended.
Any new theory will be ‘just-more-theory’.
Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments are all made from different theorems
of set theory, and can be constructed by different set theories. However, they
all share a common idea: the external realist’s T0, and Putnam’s T1, will be
distinct theories. Bays then argues that if T1 is stronger than T0, then Putnam
is confronted by a dilemma: either (i), if Putnam argues against external realists
who only approve of weaker set theory than him, then they will reject him
because they reject the set theory Putnam abides by; or (ii), if Putnam argues
against external realists who approve of similarly strong set theory as him, then
his argument fails to undermine their theories.
In essence, Bays states two methods for undermining Putnam:
(a) Rejection: An external realist who approves of T0 is not committed to T1.
So he can dismiss T1 and deny that there are any non-standard models of
T0.
(b) Ignorance: An external realist who approves of T1 as well as T0 can ignore
the existence of non-standard models of T0. He is only concerned about
the existence of non-standard models of T1 + T0. Putnam has not given
any account of such models.
Bays holds that any external realist will abide by either method to counteract
Putnam. The dilemma would demonstrate that Putnam cannot definitively
generate an unintended model for every external realist theory.
4 Argument Statement
In the case of the permutation and Skolemisation arguments, I shall follow But-
ton11 and argue that the external realist must accept that there are unintended
models for the theories he posits. In the case of the constructivisation argument,
I shall follow Kanamori12 and argue that the logic of the Constructivisation The-





will run as follows. To pose a permutation, Skolemisation, or constructivisation
argument against T0, it is perfectly adequate to assume weaker theories than
T0. So, the external realist cannot deploy either rejection or ignorance to avoid
Putnam’s arguments.
5 Skolemisation
Let us first investigate how Bays dilemma applies to the Skolemisation argu-
ment. I will then detail how the dilemma fails to threaten Skolemisation because
the argument adopts a theorem which merely relies on sufficiently weak model
theories.
5.1 Bays’ dilemma and Skolemisation
The Completeness Theorem stems from WKL0.
13 WKL0 is a mathematical
theory weaker than Z. So, we can assume the external realist’s T0 will be stronger
than WKL0 if he wants use of any rudimentary set theory. So, he will inevitably
have to admit the Completeness Theorem. Moreover, let us assume that T0
is effectively axiomatisable, since this would be a basic requirement for any
complete realist theory.14
Since T0 is stronger than WKL0, it encompasses sufficient arithmetic to
formalise language about all effectively axiomatisable theories. So T0 can for-
malise language about T0. Take L to be the language of T0. So, there exists
an L -sentence which formalises an English statement like ‘T0 is a consistent
countable set of sentences’.15 In light of this, consider:
T0-conditional : If T0 is a consistent countable set of sentences, then
there is a model N0 |= T0 whose domain is a subset of N.
The T0-conditional can be seen as a formal sentence in L . This conditional
is therefore a theorem of T0. The Completeness Theorem is also a theorem of
T0, since it is a theorem of WKL0. We can thus receive the T0-conditional by
instantiating T0 in the Completeness Theorem. So, the T0-conditional must be
true for the external realist.
However, the T0-conditional does not guarantee that T0 contains a non-
standard model N0. This can only be proved by discharging the conditional’s
antecedent. However, due to Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorems, the ex-
ternal realist cannot prove in T0 that T0 has both a consistent and countable set
of sentences. For consistency, the external realist must ascend up the hierarchy
of theories to a new theory, T1, such that T1 = T0 + Con(T0).
13WKL0 is a subset of second-order arithmetic with the addition of an axiom: Weak König’s
Lemma. The Lemma holds that every infinite subtree has an infinite path. Otherwise WKL0
abides by the axioms of RCA0, Simpson 1999, 139-141.
14It is possible to prove the same results for negation-complete theories, see Button 2011,
330
15Franzen 2004, 172–176, Button 2011, 328
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This is where Bays’ dilemma enters. (i) the external realist can reject T1 – he
approves of the conditional, but dismisses the consequent. (ii) he can approve
of T1 and acknowledge an unintended model of T0, but ignore this result since
he is merely concerned with unintended models of T1.
5.2 Skolemisation survives
(i) is strictly untenable. Following Bellotti16 we observe that, if an external
realist holds T0 to be true, then he must admit both T0 and Con(T0), because
truth entails consistency. However, this is simply to admit T1, since T1 =
T0 + Con(T0).
So the external realist is left with (ii), ignorance. Bays now has to demon-
strate that Putnam’s argument does not apply to T1. However, it is entirely
possible to apply the T0-conditional argument on T1:
T1-conditional : If T1 is a consistent countable set of sentences, then
there is a model N1 |= T1 whose domain is a subset of N.
The T1-conditional is a formal sentence in L , and is therefore a theorem of T0.
The external realist holds T1 to be true, so he holds T1 to be consistent. So, he
has to retreat to a stronger theory, T2, such that T2 = T1 + Con(T1). He must
now continue being ignorant. However this same story repeats in an infinite
regress where Putnam can always generate a new model-theoretic argument. So,
for whatever theory the external realist posits, Putnam can generate a countable
model. This is all the Skolemisation argument requires.
In essence, the only necessary requirement for Putnam’s argument is the
Indeterminacy Conditional, and since the external realist will always have to
assume T0 to have a model, he will inevitably be pushed into the grinder.
In sum, the Skolemisation argument survives Bays’ dilemma because of two
metamathematical properties inherent in the Completeness Theorem:
1. The Completeness Theorem states that any consistent set of sentences has
an ‘unintended’ model.
2. The Completeness Theorem is provable in significantly weak model theory.
By (1), all well developed theories have a countable model. By (2), the
external realist has to accept (1) because it is proven within a model theory
weaker than any he already accepts. So, whilst Putnam cannot wield a conclu-
sive formal proof against the external realist, he can nevertheless ensure that
any admissible realist theory is captured by his argument.
6 Permutation
I will now demonstrate that the two metamathematical properties just men-




6.1 Bays dilemma and permutation
The issue runs as before, either permutation can or cannot be proven in a weaker
theory than T0.
The Permutation Theorem stems from Z-I.17 Z-I is a mathematical theory
trivially weaker than Z. So, as before, we can assume the external realist’s T0
will be stronger than Z-I if he wants use of any rudimentary set theory. So, he
will inevitably accept the Permutation Theorem.
So, the previous metamathematical properties likewise apply to the permu-
tation argument:
1. The Permutation Theorem states that any consistent set of sentences has
an ‘unintended’ model.
2. The Permutation Theorem is provable in significantly weak model theory.
We can now run the same reasoning as in §5.2 against Bays. By (1), all
well developed theories have a permuted model. By (2), the external realist has
to accept (1) because it is proven within a model theory weaker than any he
already accepts. So the Permutation Theorem survives Bays’ dilemma.
Having been granted both the Permutation Theorem and the Completeness
Theorem, Putnam can severely undermine the external realist. The Complete-
ness Theorem breeds an unintended model from a theory. A classic response by
an external realist is to evade the force of the Completeness Theorem by dis-
missing the method of ‘fixed’ theories and models. However, the Permutation
Theorem breeds an unintended model from a given model. This is strictly more
problematic. The external realist necessarily perceives the world to be some
intended model of some all encompassing theory. But now the Permutation
Theorem states that any world will be accompanied by a permuted world. So,
the external realist has to accept that his theory will inevitably come with an
unintended model.
7 Constructivisation
Bays’ attack on constructivisation is a slightly harder case since it pertains
to realism about sets. I shall first explicate his objection, and then provide
a counter argument following Kanamori that the underlying conditional which
constructivisation turns upon can be provided in ZFC. This, I shall maintain,
is everything needed for the argument to run. So, like previously argued, Bay’s
dilemma will be rebutted.
17Z-I is a subsystem of Z. It contains the same axioms with the Axiom of Infinity subtracted.
Indeed, the Permutation Theorem could be proven in an even weaker set theory, ZF-IPF, where
Powersets and Replacement are further removed, Button 2011, 342.
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7.1 Bays dilemma and constructivisation
First, let us make a distinction between set-models and class-models. Let T0 be
the external realist’s object theory. Denote Putnam’s model theory as T1. T1 is
a set theory, so if there is a model of T0 in T1, then T1 implies a set with specific
properties.
However, we can infuse set theories with the notion of classes, as long as we
do not reify them.18 This enables us to state in T1 that Q is a class-model of
T0. In essence, this entails that for all sentences φ of T0:
T1 |= φQ
Here, φQ is a relativisation of φ to Q. Relativisation is specified recursively;19 if
T0 is some pure set theory, we merely note a domain Q and define the following
schema:
(x = y)Q = (x = y)
(x ∈ y)Q = (x ∈ y)
(φ ∧ ψ)Q = (φQ ∧ ψQ)
(¬φ)Q = ¬(φQ)
((∃x)φ)Q = (∃x ∈ Q)φQ
In essence, where φ is a formula in set theory, then φQ is yielded by φ from
restricting all quantifiers of φ to Q.
We now have two sorts of models: set-models and class-models. Let us now
turn to Putnam’s proof for the Constructivisation Theorem.20
Proof : The Constructivisation Theorem can be expressed as the Π2-sentence:
φ := (∀s)(∃M)(s ⊆ N→ (s ∈M ∧M |= ZF + V = L))
By Shoenfield’s Absoluteness Lemma21 we get ψL ↔ ψ, for any Π2-sentence
ψ. Proving φ, we merely prove its relativisation to L:
φL := (∀sεL)(∃MεL)(s ⊆ N→ (s ∈M ∧M |= ZF + V = L))
For all sεL, there exists a model (L), that satisfies ‘V = L’, and has s as a
member. From the Skolem Hull Theorem,22 there exists a countable submodel
M, which is equivalent to L and has s as a member. From Gödel’s Condensation




20This exposition follows Button 2011, 326
21If Π2 predicates over ω are relativised to L, then Π2 subsets of ω are constructible
22For any model A, there is a countable submodel, B, which is elementarily equivalent to
A. The theorem is an elaboration on the previously used Completeness Theorem by Skolem,
for a proof see Button 2011
23If M |= ZF + V = L is a transitive pure set-structure, then M = Lγ , for an ordinal γ.
24Putnam 1980, 468
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However, it is now evident that L is a proper class instead of a set, and the
Skolem Hull Theorem merely pertains to sets. This undermines the proof.
Evidently the proof fails in ZF, so in order to rescue the proof we would have
to give L in a set theory where it can be accommodated as a set. For instance,
we could deliver the same proof in ZFK.25 However, retreating to ZFK makes
the constructivisation argument prey for Bays’ Dilemma. The external realist
can reject ZFK since it is stronger than ZF; or he can approve of ZFK and
welcome non-standard models of ZF, but ignore such models since he is merely
concerned with non-standard models of ZFK.
7.2 Constructivisation survives
We can observe that Putnam’s proof crucially turns on Shoenfield’s Absolute-
ness Lemma. Bays’ critique attacks its ability to do so: the Constructivisation
Theorem cannot be a theorem of ZF because it asserts the existence of a model
of ZF, and hence the consistency of ZF. However, were one to demand that the
Constructivisation Theorem should be stipulated in ZFC to appeal to Shoen-
field, then it is possible to do so. Consider the following conditional:
1. If for any real s there is an ∈-model of ZF containing s, then for any real
s there is an ω-model of ZF + V = L containing s.
Assuming a constructible real s, there exists by hypothesis an ∈-model M
of ZF with s as a member, so there exists a model in the form (Lγ ,∈), i.e.
∀sρ → ∀sψ. So, the Π2 sentence φ is satisfied in L, and Putnam’s conclusion
ensues by Shoenfield.
Putnam’s indeterminacy arguments all turn on the Indeterminacy Condi-
tional at root, and they can all be borne by its logic. This conditional was
initially supported in ZFC by Putnam’s Downward-Löwenheim Skolem Theo-
rem, but even stronger ZFC results can be deployed to the same end.26 As
Putnam himself notes,27 consider Barwise’s Theorem:
2. Every countable model of ZF has a proper end extension which is a model
of ZF + V = L.
If (i) 〈A,B〉 and (ii) 〈A,B′〉 are models of ZF, then (ii) is an extension of (i)
if A ⊆ B, and the membership relation M ′ extends the membership relation M.
Additionally, (ii) is an end extension if for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and M ′ba, implies
that b ∈ A. The theorem is a strong upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem which
yields an end extension that satisfies V = L.
Finally, the Constructivisation Theorem uses ω-models. These can be sup-
ported by a corollary of Barwise’s theorem:
25ZFK is ZF with the additional conjecture that there is some unattainable cardinal κ, see




3. If there is a countable ∈-model of ZF containing a real s, then there is an
ω-model of ZF + V = L containing s.
In essence, if (1) is schematised as ∀sρ→ ∀sψ, then (3) is a stronger version
∀x(ρ→ ψ).
Rendering the Indeterminacy Conditional in ZFC by the above, we can
apply the aforementioned mathematical properties (1-2) as before. By (1), all
well developed theories have an ω-model of ZF + V = L containing s. By (2),
the external realist has to accept (1) because it is proven within a model theory
weaker than any he already accepts. So, the constructivisation argument evades
Bays’ dilemma.
8 Conclusion
Bays has sought to undermine Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments by a dilemma.
Following Button, I have aimed to demonstrate that his dilemma is unfounded
whilst two metamethematical properties remain attached to Putnam’s argu-
ments: (1), the theorem must state that any consistent set of sentences has
an unintended model; and (2), the theorem is provable in a significantly weak
model theory. The application of these properties to Putnam’s arguments have
been shown unthreatened by Bays’ objections.
Whenever Putnam’s theorems have properties (1) and (2), the external re-
alist is sucked into Putnam’s theory grinder. He must therefore admit that his
theory has unintended models and provide some theory as to why they are un-
intended rather than intended. The metamathematical legitimacy of this result
is what I have sought to demonstrate. It still remains open whether the external
realist can undermine Putnam’s arguments by providing some general account
of what creates an unintended model. But it should now be clear that this is the
structure of discourse within which the external realist is confined, and being
so confined his methods for recourse are hitherto severely limited.
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